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THE REGULATION OF ARTIST REPRESENTATION IN
THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
The representation of artists' is a curious phenomenon. The talent
and potential of the actor, singer, dancer and writer attract many individ-
uals who want to play a role in the harnessing and exploiting of that
talent for profit and glory. This comment will take an in-depth look at
artists' representatives, the roles they play and the laws designed to regu-
late them.
Special attention will be given to the California Entertainment Com-
mission's findings on artist representation, to the New Talent Agencies
Act,2 and the failure of each to solve the serious problems that confront
artist representation in the entertainment industry. The most critical is-
sue is the ongoing conflict between agents 3 and personal managers.4 The
1. "Artists" means: "[A]ctors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate stage
and in the production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical organizations,
directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, musical directors, writers,
cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists and persons ren-
dering professional services in motion picture, theatrical, radio, television and other entertain-
ment enterprises. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(b) (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
Commonly, people think of artists as masters of the fine arts and use the specific titles of
actor, musician, singer and dancer to describe entertainers. In this comment, as in the Talent
Agencies Act, the word "artist" refers to all those personal and professional services that are
rendered in the entertainment field and which comport to the Act's definition.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988). See infra text
accompanying note 9.
3. "Talent agency" (and the agents who work for it) means:
[A] person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering,
promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or
artists, except that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to procure re-
cording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or corpora-
tion to regulation and licensing under... [the Talent Agencies Act]. Talent agencies
may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their professional
careers. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1986).
The Code language that talent agents "may" counsel artists in career development is important
because this overlaps with the realm of the personal manager and is one of the points of con-
tention between the two groups.
4. Personal managers have no official definition under law, rather they are self-regulated
and do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Department. They do, however, play a
large role in the careers of entertainers and in the arena of artist representation.
Personal managers are engaged in the occupation of advising and counseling talent and
personalities in the theatrical, entertainment, and literary professions. Areas where advice and
counsel to the artist is given by personal managers are:
(1) The selection of literary, artistic, and musical materials;
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law in this regard has been and remains inadequate to resolve this
conflict.
There is the story about a she-wolf who has many offspring in her
litter and only so many "tits" for them to hang on for nourishment.
Often the artist must feel like the she-wolf, with many "representatives"
hanging on, sucking her milk (and money) without mercy. The artist
films a successful movie, writes a best-selling book, sings a hit song. The
money rolls in. The agent takes ten per cent.5 The personal manager
takes fifteen percent to twenty-five percent.6 The attorney7 takes his fee.
The artist pays back any "front money." 8 Only then does the artist get
what remains.
Perhaps this view is too pessimistic. Perhaps we too often see the
artist as the one who deserves all the credit and reward for "making it
big" (if and when he or she finally does), and we piously sit back and
(2) Any and all matters relating to publicity, public relations and advertising;
(3) The adoption of the proper format for the best presentation of the artist's talents;
(4) The selection of booking agents to procure maximum employment for the artist;
(5) The types of employment which the artists should accept and which would be most bene-
ficial to their careers;
(6) The selection and supervision of accountants and attorneys other than those used by the
manager. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 85 (1985). The relation-
ship between the artist and the personal manager is an extremely close one. The manager often
has such an important role as adviser, friend, father, or banker to the artist that he becomes the
artist's alter ego. "The reliance of some artists on managers for repertoire and creative gui-
dance, as well as for business decisions, is such that there is sometimes as much truth as humor
in the statement that the artist is a mere figment of his manager's imagination." Id.
For their services, personal managers often receive 15-25 percent of the artist's earnings.
Id. at 86. This percentage is significantly larger than the percentage taken by agents and some-
times draws resentment from agents. Personal managers regulate themselves through the Con-
ference of Personal Managers. While there is a standard form of Personal Manager
agreements, it need not be approved by unions or the Labor Commissioner. Managers are
often looked down upon by the other players in the artist representation game. They are
viewed by lawyers and agents as not doing the substantive work of hammering out contracts or
booking employment, but rather of merely fixing the artists hair and being "yes" men.
5. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 89, 90 (1985).
6. Id. at 86.
7. Entertainment attorneys have been defined in various ways. Entire essays have been
written on the question, "What is an entertainment lawyer?" Simensky, Defining Entertain-
ment Law. A Merger of Business and Legal Considerations, N.Y.L.J. 5, Sept. 29, 1985. Gener-
ally, an entertainment lawyer is a lawyer who represents clients in the entertainment industry.
Some entertainment lawyers walk the thin lines between lawyer, agent and personal manager.
In so doing they may breach their professional responsibility as members of the bar.
8. "Front money" is the capital expended at the outset by the production company to
finance an initial project. In the case of recording artists, the production company pays all
expenses for the record master to be recorded, advertised and distributed. Once the record is
released and profits are generated, the production company is reimbursed itself for its initial
expenditures. The percentages for the profit participants are then calculated.
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view as impure the representatives without whom the artist never would
have made it.
The relationships between the characters in the field of artist repre-
sentation have developed as a result of years of history and experience.
The methods devised to regulate and monitor the treatment of artists by
their representatives will comprise the majority of this comment. This
comment will examine the "game" of artist representation-its players,
rules, highlights, low points, successes and failures. Throughout, one
should be mindful of the human beings involved, their trials and tribula-
tions, the costs and benefits which befall the actual individuals involved
as a result of legislation, administrative and judicial decisions and other
factors.
If the game is artist representation, then the rule book is the Talent
Agencies Act ("the Act") of the California Labor Code ("the Code"),9
which serves as a model act for the regulation of employment agents in
the entertainment industry throughout the nation. Given the many en-
tertainment industry transactions which occur in California, and Califor-
nia's stated goal of serving as the leader in the field, definitions in this
comment are from the Labor Code, and sections of the Code will be cited
accordingly.
II. THE LAW REGARDING THE REGULATION OF ARTIST
REPRESENTATION: THE ARTISTS' MANAGERS ACT AND
THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT
The body of law within the California Labor Code which governs
the representation of artists is the Talent Agencies Act."° The Talent
Agencies Act, enacted in 1978, was largely a recodification of the Artists'
Managers Act. " In the now famous Jefferson Airplane case,' 2 The Art-
ists' Managers Act was held to be a remedial statute enacted to protect
those seeking employment and was found to be a constitutional exercise
of the state's police power.
While there were amendments to the Act in 1982 and 1986, a look
at the original statutory and case law is required before the current law
can be fully understood. Article One of the Artists' Managers Act pro-
vided the scope and definitions, such as "artist manager"' 3 (now talent
9. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
10. Id.
11. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.2-1700.45 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
12. Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967), aff'd,
Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493 (1972).
13. See supra note 3.
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agent) and "artist."' 4 Other important definitions, especially "procuring
employment," were left out. Had the definition of "procuring employ-
ment" been included, subsequent confusion and litigation may have been
minimized.
Article Two, "Licenses," included the laws regarding application for
licenses, conduct of business, filing fee, bond requirements, hearings, and
powers of the Labor Commissioner.' 5 The requirements of this Article
were many, and included affidavits of character, 16 the possibility of a La-
bor Commission investigation,' 7 license and filing fees'" and the posting
of a fee schedule.' 9
Article Three, "Operations and Management," 2 required approval
of form contracts2' and the keeping of detailed records22 open to inspec-
tion by the Labor Commissioner.23
Because of employment practices that have occurred in the past, the
Artists' Managers Act contained provisions against sending women or
minors to disorderly houses as employees,24 sending minors to saloons,25
permitting persons of bad character to frequent the artist manager's
place of business26 and conducting business in a room where persons
sleep.
A. Defining the Procuring of Employment
As comprehensive and clear as the Talent Agencies Act attempts to
be, a major problem was written into the Act when the legislators failed
to provide a definition for procuring employment. Without this defini-
tion, it is extremely difficult to determine whether a person is violating
the Act.
A prima facie showing that an unlicensed person procured employ-
ment for an artist invokes the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner.28
14. See supra note 1.
15. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.5-1700.22 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
16. Id. § 1700.6.
17. Id. § 1700.7.
18. Id. § 1700.13.
19. Id. § 1700.24.
20. Id. §§ 1700.23-1700.46.
21. Id. § 1700.23.
22. Id. § 1700.26.
23. Id. § 1700.27.
24. Id. § 1700.33.
25. Id. § 1700.34.
26. Id. § 1700.35.
27. Id. § 1700.9(d).
28. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music at 360.
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If the Labor Commissioner finds that a personal manager procured em-
ployment for an artist, then the contracts between the artist and manager
are void. "Since the clear object of the Act is to prevent improper per-
sons from becoming artists' managers [agents] and to regulate such activ-
ity for the protection of the public, a contract between an unlicensed
artist manager and an artist is void."2 9
In Buchwald v. Superior Court,3" the issue of employment procure-
ment was paramount, and it mirrored arguments in prior and subsequent
litigation. The personal manager, Katz, argued that as long as he did not
initiate the negotiations, his discussions of employment for his client did
not constitute procurement.3 ' Jefferson Airplane argued that, regardless
of who made the initial overtures, negotiations equalled procurement.32
Nearly every case that comes before the Labor Commissioner in-
volves an initial determination of whether or not a person who is not
licensed as a talent agent has unlawfully procured employment. Even
with all the cases that have been resolved,33 no single definition has been
accepted. Cases are decided on an ad hoc basis, and Labor Commission
decisions remain very fact specific.
With such a vague definition of procuring employment, personal
managers must proceed very carefully. Since any negotiation or solicita-
tion can be construed as procuring employment, the personal manager is
severely limited in serving his client. This lack of a clear definition is
harmful to the artist, the manager and the entertainment industry as a
whole.
B. Setting the Talent Agencies Act Into Motion: Filing a Petition to
Determine Controversy
To put into effect the provisions of the Act, a party files a "Petition
29. Id. at 351.
30. 254 Cal. App 2d. 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
31. Post-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 2 (Jan. 27, 1977). In his answer to plaintiff's
interrogatory, defendant Katz said, "As the group's personal manager, it was my principal
responsibility to advise them in the development and enhancement of their professional ca-
reers, including giving them advice on which job offer to accept, and which to reject and for
what reasons." Plaintiff's Interrogatory of Matthew Katz at 5 (June 21, 1976).
32. Post-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 2 (Jan. 27, 1977).
33. "Between December 1977 and September 1983, thirty-one petitions to determine con-
troversies were filed with the Labor Commissioner. Of the thirty-one cases, the Labor Com-
missioner determined in favor of the artists' representatives only three times." Julian, Personal
Manager or Talent Agent? A Summary of Recent California Labor Commission Findings in
Regulation of Entertainers' Representatives, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS
HANDBOOK, 315 (1984).
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to Determine Controversy" with the office of the Labor Commissioner. 4
The Labor Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
arising under the Act. After an administrative hearing, appeals may be
made to the superior court and be heard de novo.35 Amendments have
changed certain aspects of the Act, and will be discussed and evaluated
in light of the California Entertainment Commission's report later in this
comment.
C. Cases and Labor Commission Rulings Under the Acts
A survey of case rulings under the Acts is necessary for an analysis
of the current Talent Agencies Act and for an accurate and informed
coverage of whether the Act meets the needs of the industry which it
seeks to serve.
1. Buchwald v. Superior Court ("The Jefferson Airplane Case")
The most well known case in the area of artist representation is the
Buchwald case.3 6 The court in Buchwald ruled on important issues deal-
ing with the jurisdiction and scope of the Artists' Managers Act. The
facts that gave rise to Buchwald are not unique in the entertainment busi-
ness. Matthew Katz served as personal manager of the rock group Jeffer-
son Airplane ("the Airplane") pursuant to individual contracts with each
band member.
Two aspects of these contracts highlight the Act and its application.
First, the contracts provided that Katz serve as "personal representative,
adviser and manager in the entertainment field"3 7 and that Katz was not
authorized and would not obtain employment for the group. In actual-
ity, however, Katz did procure employment with the approval and grati-
tude of the Airplane. Second, the agreements stated that any disputes
between the parties would be brought to arbitration before the American
Arbitration Association. 8
As often happens between powerful and power-hungry people-
those in the entertainment industry are no exception-a dispute arose
between Katz and members of the Airplane. Pursuant to the contractual
language, Katz brought the dispute to arbitration. 9 Wanting to break its
contract with Katz, however, the Airplane filed a Petition to Determine
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
37. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 351.
38. Id. at 352.
39. Id.
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Controversy with the Labor Commissioner, pursuant to Section 1700.44
of the Act. The Airplane accused Katz of acting as a talent agent with-
out a license, and sued in superior court to enjoin any arbitration.'
Katz objected to the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction on two
grounds. Katz' first objection was that because the contract expressed
that he was not a licensed talent agent, the Act did not apply to him. To
this argument, the court held that the Act applied to artist managers and
to unlicensed persons who act as artist managers, even if the contract
states that they are not acting as such. This de facto, substance-over-
form approach showed that the court meant business with regard to the
regulation of agents and the prevention of unlicensed employment
procurement.
Katz' second argument was that arbitration was proper because the
contract called for it, and that arbitration was permitted in Section
1700.45 of the Talent Agencies Act. The court held that if Katz did not
comply with the Act, his contracts with the members of the Airplane
were invalid, and therefore no rights could be derived from the
agreements. 4 '
The Katz-Airplane dispute was heard before the Labor Commis-
sioner in 1969. Having been found to violate the Act, Katz' contracts
with the Airplane were voided. Katz was ordered to return all commis-
sions received from his work done for the Airplane. Further, Katz was
denied any reimbursement for money spent to assist the musicians in
their career.42 Part of the penalty incurred in this instance was due to
fraud and a breach of fiduciary duty owed by Katz to the Airplane, but
the remedy would most likely have been as severe with only the Code
violation. The Buchwald case was heard by the California Supreme
Court in Buchwald v. Katz. 43 The supreme court, however, ruled primar-
ily on the procedural issues of jurisdiction and the right to appeal. The
substantive findings of Buchwald v. Superior Court remain valid. Several
subsequent cases have continued to impose the severe penalties handed
down by the California Labor Commissioner in Buchwald. McFadden v.
Ripp" and Sinnamon v. McKay"5 followed Buchwald's lead by imposing
40. Id. at 353.
41. Id. at 360.
42. In this case, Katz had to return over $50,000 to the members of the Airplane. In
subsequent cases, managers acting as unlicensed agents have been ordered to return far more
substantial sums to their clients.
43. 8 Cal. 3d 493 (1972).
44. No. SFMP 71 TAC 7-78 at 6 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. Dec. 18, 1980).
45. No. SFMP 73 TAC 9-80 at 6 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. May 8, 1981).
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the same three stringent remedies: voiding the contracts, returning the
commissions and disallowing reimbursement of expenses.
2. Pryor v. Franklin
Another case that exemplifies the severity of the Labor Commis-
sioner's determinations is Pryor v. Franklin." Richard Pryor filed a Peti-
tion to Determine Controversy and claimed that his personal manager
David Franklin acted as an unlicensed agent. Pryor sought to void
Franklin's contract and to confiscate all Franklin's commissions. The
Labor Commissioner ordered Franklin to return to Pryor $3,110,918
"representing all monies and things of value which Respondent received
for services performed as an unlicensed artists' manager and talent agent
($753,217) and all monies and things of value which Respondent will-
fully misappropriated from Petitioner through his role as Petitioner's art-
ist's manager and talent agent ($2,357,701)."1
7
3. A Less Stringent Alternative: Fleming and
the Quantum Meruit Approach
While most of the Labor Commissioner's decisions have been severe
and have allowed no compensation to managers for actual legitimate
managerial services performed, at least one has taken a less severe ap-
proach. In Bank of America v. Fleming,4" the Labor Commission Hear-
ing Officer used quantum meruit in ordering the respondent to return
only the commissions received while acting as an unlicensed artist's man-
ager. The manager earned more than $400,000 in commissions. She was
ordered to return $80,000 to her client. The hearing officer determined
that only twenty percent of the manager's time was spent on illegal em-
ployment procurement and therefore $80,000, or twenty percent of
$400,000, had to be returned.
While there must be penalties for violations of the Labor Code, and
some artists are justified in filing petitions to determine controversy with
the Labor Commissioner, the Fleming decision seems a much fairer ap-
proach than the others. To void all contracts and order the return of all
monies earned often spells disaster for the manager, even after years of
hard work and investment on behalf of his client. The Labor Commis-
sioner's consistent rulings have become a sword in the hands of selfish
and greedy artists who, after benefiting from years of the manager's serv-
46. No. TAC 17 MP 114 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. August 12, 1982).
47. Id. at 2-3.
48. No. 1098 ASC MP 432 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. January 14, 1982).
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ices and openly welcoming employment procured by the manager, turn
the manager in for reward money.
III. PERSONAL MANAGERS ATTEMPTS TO AVOID THE TALENT
AGENCIES ACT AND THE UNIONS
Under the current scheme, personal managers are clearly stuck be-
tween a rock and a hard place. If they register to become agents, they
may lawfully procure employment. However, they become subject to
union rules,4 9 ceilings on commissions and strict government regulation.
If they procure employment while only acting as a personal manager,
they face the loss of their commissions and the voiding of their contracts.
One solution is for managers to simply not procure employment.
This, however, is easier said than done.5 ° First, the term "procuring em-
ployment" is necessarily vague. Second, agents generally do not take on
unknown artists, and therefore managers are the only ones who get the
artists on their feet, loan them money, and of course, book their acts in
the hopes of getting a substantial return on their investment. Third,
when someone is responsible for another person's career and professional
development, it is difficult for them not to be involved in the arrangement
of employment which furthers that career.
Not wanting to fall prey to either of the two extreme options of
registering as an agent or being destroyed by the Labor Commissioner,
personal managers have attempted to maneuver around the California
laws. The foremost method managers have used to escape the reach of
49. In addition to the state restrictions, unions and guilds also impose strict regulations on
agents. Unions, such as the American Federation of Musicians (AF of M), the American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) and the American Guild of Variety
Artists (AGVA) dictate the maximum percentage that agents receive, the language of contracts
that agents use and many other aspects of agent-artist relations. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOV-
SKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 89 (1985). AFTRA and The Screen Actors Guild (SAG) have
set limits on the amount of commissions an agent may receive at 10 per cent. AFTRA Regula-
tions § XX cl. B, C; SAG Rule § XI, cl. A, B. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, at 629. In some
circumstances, however, AF of M allows 15 per cent or 20 per cent. AF of M Const. art. 23,
§ 8, cl. (a)(i)(ii). See, Standard AF of M Exclusive Agent-Musician Agreement. See SHEMEL
& KRASILOVSKY at 635-36.
As a rule, unions do not regulate personal managers. The independence of managers and
dependence of agents upon the unions fuels the fire between agents and personal managers.
One reason why personal managers do not simply register as agents, thereby escaping liability
for procuring employment, is that they do not want to come under the strict regulation of the
unions. An exception to the rule that most personal managers are not regulated by unions is
that the AF of M does have regulations regarding personal managers. See SHEMEL &
KRASILOVSKY at 89.
50. See generally Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager, 6 COMM/ENT. L.J. 837,
839 (1984).
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the Labor Commissioner and the unions have been by manipulating con-
tractual wording to meet their needs. In Buchwald, two techniques were
attempted, but were unsuccessful.
The first contractual provision, used by the Airplane's manager
Katz to avoid the Talent Agencies Act, was a disclaimer stating that the
personal manager was not an artist's manager or agent, and was not au-
thorized to procure employment for the artist. This language is still
found in the standard personal management agreement, but it does not
protect the personal manager. The Labor Commissioner looks beyond
the four corners of the document to see what the manager has actually
done. If the manager is unlawfully procuring employment, then it does
not matter what the contract says or the parties agreed to. The Labor
Commissioner may and probably will impose penalties.
The second contractual technique is an attempt to remove any dis-
pute between parties from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Com-
missioner by agreeing to binding arbitration. Even though personal
managers argue that an arbitration provision removes the case from the
Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction, the court, as was done in Buchwald,
will rule the contract void and remove all force and effect from the arbi-
tration provision. The Talent Agencies Act allows arbitration clauses in
contracts, but insures that the contracts are with licensed agents. 5
IV. 1982 AMENDMENTS
Relief was sought at the legislative level in 1982 because of the con-
fusion surrounding the Talent Agencies Act and its applicability. As-
sembly Bill 997, signed into law as Chapter 682 of the California Labor
Code, became effective on January 1, 1983.52
It is interesting to note that much of the political maneuvering re-
51. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.45 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988) states that:
[a] provision in a contract providing for the decision by arbitration of any contro-
versy under the contract or as to its existence, validity, construction, performance,
nonperformance, breach, operation, continuance, or termination, shall be valid:
(a) If the provision is contained in a contract between a talent agency and a person
for whom the talent agency under the contract undertakes to endeavor to secure
employment, or
(b) If the provision is inserted in the contract pursuant to any rule, regulation, or
contract of a bona fide labor union regulating the relations of its members to a talent
agency, and
(c) If the contract provides for reasonable notice to the Labor Commissioner of the
time and place of all arbitration hearings, and
(d) If the contract provides that the Labor Commissioner or his or her authorized
representative has the right to attend all arbitration hearings ....
Id.
52. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1701 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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garding the regulation of agents occurred while Jerry Brown was Gover-
nor of California. It was widely known throughout the state that
Governor Brown had been dating recording star Linda Ronstadt. Ron-
stadt had a very good relationship with her personal manager, as implied
in a favorable review "which stated that one of the obvious reasons for
(Linda Ronstadt's) becoming one of the most popular woman singers in
the world is 'the symbiosis between her evolving artistic gifts and her
manager and record producer, Peter Asher, who has guided her career
for four years.' "" It is certainly possible that Governor Brown came to
realize the need for something to be done about the personal managers'
situation through Linda Ronstadt.
Various changes were made to the 1978 law in 1982. Section 1700.4
created an exemption for the procuring of employment for artists' "re-
cording contracts." This amendment, however, seems more significant
than it actually is, because most managers who procure recording con-
tracts also procure engagements for the artist. An unlicensed engage-
ment procurement violates the law. A second change adds a one year
statute of limitations provision to the law. This serves to protect manag-
ers from claims against them for activities in which they allegedly en-
gaged years before.
5 4
A third amendment allows for managers and agents to work in con-
junction, thereby relieving some managers from liability under the Act.55
This encourages cooperation between agents and managers, although
whether they will cooperate and extend themselves professionally for
each other is still questionable.
The 1982 Amendments also repealed Section 1700.46 of the Act,
which provided for criminal sanctions against a violator. Most impor-
tantly, however, the 1982 Amendments created the California Entertain-
ment Commission.
A. The California Entertainment Commission
The California Entertainment Commission ("the Commission") was
"mandated to recommend to the Governor and the Legislature any
changes deemed appropriate to California's Talent Agencies Act which
might serve to make the Act a model bill regarding the licensing of
agents and other representatives of artists in the entertainment indus-
try."5 6 Composed of three artists, three agents, three personal managers,
53. S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 85 (1985).
54. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
55. Id.
56. Report of the California Entertainment Commission 4, Dec. 2, 1985.
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and the Labor Commissioner,57 the Commission has carried out its mis-
sion and filed its report with the Governor. The rest of this comment
will be chiefly devoted to the findings of the Commission, the resultant
amendments to the Talent Agencies Act in 1986, and an analysis of the
current state of the law of artist representation.
The Commission, after analyzing the California Talent Agencies
Act and studying the relevant laws and practices of other states' en-
tertainment centers throughout the nation, concluded that "the Talent
Agencies Act of California is a sound and workable statute and the rec-
ommendations contained in this report will, if enacted by the California
Legislature, make that Act a model statute of its kind in the United
States."5" Except for minor alterations in language, all of the recommen-
dations in the Commission's report were adopted by the California Legis-
lature and signed into law.5 9 Therefore, analysis of the Commission's
report and the current law must go hand-in-hand. Criticism of the Com-
mission's report is also criticism of the California Legislature for codify-
ing the report in the New Talent Agencies Act. The Commission framed
six issues which needed resolution.
Issue One: Who May Procure Employment?
Of the six issues considered by the Commission, the most important
was whether personal managers or anyone other than a licensed talent
agent should be allowed to procure employment for an artist.' This was
the true issue that the Commission was formed to resolve, as it has been
the main point of contention between talent agents and personal manag-
ers throughout their history.
On this point, the Commission sided with the agents and recom-
mended that the current state of the law be maintained. This allows only
licensed talent agents to lawfully procure employment for artists. The
Commission characterized the positions of agents and managers as
follows.
57. The Commission's members were:
Artists - Ed Asner, John Forsythe, Cicely Tyson.
Agents - Jeffrey Berg, Roger Davis, Richard Rosenberg.
Managers - Bob Finkelstein, Patricia McQueeney, Larry Thompson.
Labor Commissioner - C. Robert Simpson, Jr.
58. Report of the California Entertainment Commission 4, Dec. 2, 1985.
59. CALIFORNIA STATUTES of 1986, Chapter 488. Effective January 1, 1987. Most of the
amendments to the Talent Agencies Act were effective on January 1, 1987. However, three
major provisions similar to the 1982 amendments, but deleted in 1985 because of the sunset
provision, were deemed operative as of January 1, 1986. Id.
60. Report of the California Entertainment Commission 6, Dec. 2, 1985.
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The talent agents hold the view that anyone who procures employ-
ment for an artist should be subject to the same regulations that restrict
all agents. Agents see it as an issue of fair play in that managers should
not be allowed an unfair advantage, especially in light of the fact that
managers already receive a greater percentage of the artist's profits.6 '
Personal managers argue that in the ordinary course of their busi-
ness, managers have no choice but to engage in certain activities which
could be construed as employment procurement. Managers feel unfairly
restricted in performing their profession. When counseling the artist in
his career, the manager must be very careful not to do anything which
might appear to be employment procurement. 62 The extreme care which
managers are forced to take has a chilling effect on their services to their
clients.
The Commission attempted to find a compromise between these two
positions. Its members considered various proposals, but were unable to
achieve a common ground. Some of the alternative proposals included
allowing personal managers to engage in casual conversations about an
artist's employment, allowing artists to call their managers into existing
employment negotiations and allowing personal managers to work to-
gether with agents. None of these alternatives met with the Commis-
sioner's approval.
In finding a solution to the issue of who may lawfully procure em-
ployment for artists, the Commission stated the following.
In searching for the permissible limits to activities in which an
unlicensed personal manager, or anyone, could engage in pro-
curing employment for an artist without being licensed as a tal-
ent agent, [we] conclude that there is no such activity, that
there are not such permissible limits, and that the prohibitions
of the Act over the activities of anyone procuring employment
for an artist without being licensed as a talent agent must re-
main, as they are intended to be, total. Exceptions in the na-
ture of incidental, occasional or infrequent activities relating in
any way to procuring employment for an artist cannot be per-
mitted: one either is, or is not, licensed as a talent agent, and if
not so licensed, one cannot expect to engage, with impunity, in
any activity relating to the services which a talent agent is li-
censed to render.63
61. Id. at 8-9.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. at II.
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This hard-line approach will surely lead to more of the same severe
decisions that have already been handed down by the Labor Commis-
sion. It seems that the California Entertainment Commission abdicated
its responsibility on the very issue that it was charged to resolve. The
problem will not go away simply because the Commission has reaffirmed
the current law. The law as it stands does not work. This is exemplified
by the rulings of the Labor Commissioner, the continuing inability of
personal managers to carry on their profession without violating the law,
and the need for the Commission in the first place.
By not allowing for at least some leniency to enable personal manag-
ers to practice their profession, the Entertainment Commission de-
faulted. The smooth functioning of the entertainment industry and the
health of its members' relationships is a common goal, which the Com-
mission was supposed to further. In approving the status quo, the Com-
mission passed up a prime opportunity to recommend some real changes
which would have facilitated the resolution of this continually thorny
issue between agents and managers.
Other authors on this subject have espoused ideas which, although
not perfect, may substantially improve the situation. These ideas range
from complete deregulation of the field, to a uniform act which would
govern all artists' representatives."
The best suggestion to date is the incidental booking exemption.
This exemption allows personal managers to procure employment with-
out a license, to the extent that the procurement is incidental to the man-
agers' main service to their clients. There are obvious problems of degree
here, but this is an approach that the Commission may have attempted
with some success.
New York has an incidental booking exemption in its Employment
Agency Act.65 There, personal managers of theatrical artists need not be
licensed if their employment procurement is incidental to their manage-
ment services. A California exemption such as this might alleviate some
of the difficulty that personal managers now face, without infringing too
much upon the agents' domain.
Issue Two: Exemption for Procurement of Recording Contracts
As absolute as the Commission makes its restriction out to be, an
exemption does exist for anyone procuring a recording contract for an
64. See generally Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A Legisla-
tive Solution, 6 COMM/ENT L.J. 837 (1984).
65. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1987).
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artist. The Commission, in recommending that the Section 1700.4 ex-
emption be retained, wrote that "a recording contract is an employment
contract of a different nature from those in common usage in the indus-
try involving personal services."66
The Commission mentions the efforts of the personal manager on
behalf of the artist, explaining why the personal manager should be al-
lowed to procure employment when it comes to recording contracts.
Personal managers "contribute financial support for the living and busi-
ness expenses of entertainers, . . . act as a conduit between the artist and
the recording company, . . . accompany the artist" in his travels, and
most importantly, conduct negotiations.
6 7
It seems quite arbitrary that the Commission chose to recognize the
role of the manager in the context of recording contracts and to grant
him an exemption, but not to acknowledge the manager in other con-
texts. Perhaps the industry standards are so clear that they dictate this
specific exemption in lieu of others. It should be almost equally as clear,
however, that the manager's role in other representative contexts should
allow him some kind of exemption of limited negotiating capacity. The
recording contract exemption makes even less sense in light of the Com-
mission's finding that "one either is or is not, licensed as a talent agent,
and if not so licensed, one cannot expect to engage ... [in employment
procurement]. ' 6' The Commission first purports to make the issue air-
tight. Then, the Commission proceeds to punch holes in its finding, cre-
ating large leaks of logic and reason.
Issue Three: Criminal Sanctions
The third issue considered by the Commission was whether to re-
store criminal sanctions which had been removed from the Act by Cali-
fornia Assembly Bill 99769 to the revised Act. The Commission
determined that criminal liability should not be imposed on violators of
the Talent Agencies Act. The Commission begins to hammer nails into
its own coffin with its reasoning for this decision. The Commission
states that "there is an inherent inequity-and some question of constitu-
tional due process-in subjecting one to criminal sanctions for the viola-
tion of a law which is so unclear and ambiguous as to leave reasonable
persons in doubt about the meaning of the language or whether a viola-
66. Report of the California Entertainment Commission, 13, Dec. 2, 1985.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 11.
69. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1701 (West 1971) (repealed 1986).
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tion has occurred."7 The Commission then writes that "the uncertainty
of knowing when such [unlawful] activity may or may not have occurred
at pain of criminal sanctions has left the personal manager uncertain and
highly apprehensive about the permissible parameters of their daily
activity."'"
There is no less uncertainty because of criminal sanctions than there
is with the strict civil and monetary penalties that currently exist. Per-
sonal managers are still highly apprehensive about the parameters of
their daily activities, and removing the criminal penalties is of dubious
consequence.
The confusion that the Commission admits exists has not been less-
ened by the Commission's report and subsequent legislation. The Com-
mission, instead of inconsequentially removing the criminal penalties
because of the chilling effect upon managers, could have made a real
difference by removing the confusion instead.
Issue Four: Deletion of the Sunset Provisions
The 1982 amendments to the Talent Agencies Act contained a sun-
set provision which would end the 1982 amendments unless acted upon
by the Legislature. The Commission voted to delete the sunset provi-
sions of the Act and thereby retain the amendments.
The reasoning of the Commission was that the Act should be made
part of the permanent laws of the state of California and that the prior
changes were beneficial. It made sense for the Commission to delete the
sunset clauses and thereby incorporate the previous amendments into the
new Act. The 1982 amendments did modernize the Act, but the 1986
amendment failed to handle the Act's existing problems.
Issue Five: Repealing the Talent Agencies Act and the Separate
Licensing of Personal Managers
The Commission's fifth issue was whether the entire Talent Agen-
cies Act should be repealed. This was answered in the negative, as the
Commission viewed the Act, with the Commission's proposals, as an ex-
emplary one. The Commission also saw no need for personal managers
to be regulated by a separate body of law. The Commission stressed that
"it is not a person who is being licensed by the Talent Agencies Act:
rather, it is the activity of procuring employment. Whoever performs
70. Report of the California Entertainment Commission, 15-16, Dec. 2, 1985.
71. Id. at 16.
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that activity is legally defined as a talent agent and is licensed, as such." 2
Therefore, the Commission sees no need to license personal managers. If
managers procure employment, they fall under the Act; if they do not
procure employment, then the Act does not apply.
This is a sensible response from the Commission, especially because
the personal managers regulate themselves through the Conference of
Personal Managers. Like attorneys in a state bar, personal managers set
their own standards and procedures. To require them to be licensed and
regulated would not serve to protect artists any more than they are al-
ready protected.
Issue Six: Additional Language Changes
The Commission, in reviewing the Act, saw various language
changes as being necessary to fine-tune the statute. One change was to
add "models" within the list of entertainers who qualify as "artists." 3
Another change was to amend Section 1700.9. Instead of an itemized
restriction on an agent conducting business "where meals are served" or
"where persons sleep," more general language was inserted to prohibit an
agent from conducting business "in a place that would endanger the
health, safety, or welfare of the artist."74
A third amendment increased the bond required for license issuance
from $1,000 to $10,000, because the increased price "serves as a truer test
of the financial credibility of the applicant and will provide more mean-
ingful protection to the artist who may have to have recourse to the
bond."75 Section 1700.25 was substantially changed to provide proce-
dures for the maintenance of a trust fund by the agent for the artist.
Payment is required to be made within 15 days of receipt, and separate
records must be maintained of all financial transactions.7 6
An arbitration provision may be written into the contract pursuant
to Section 1700.45 if certain requirements are met by the union. These
requirements include notice to the Labor Commissioner and approval by
the union.7 7 Finally, a civil rights provision was added as Section
1700.47. This makes it "unlawful for any licensee under this Act to re-
fuse to represent any artist on account of that artist's race, color, creed,
72. Id. at 20.
73. Id. at 23. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
74. Report of the California Entertainment Commission 24, Dec. 2, 1985. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1700.9(a) (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
75. Report of the California Entertainment Commission 25, Dec. 2, 1985. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1700.15 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
76. Report of the California Entertainment Commission 28, Dec. 2, 1985.
77. Id. at 32.
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sex, national origin, religion, or handicap. 978
While the Commission gave some recommendations which led to
beneficial changes to the Act, it neglected to resolve the fundamental is-
sue dividing agents and managers. As a result, the conflicts between the
two parties will continue. Artists will be harmed in the long run because
of the uncertainty, confusion and conflict between managers and agents
who should be working together to assist the artist.
Responses to the Commission's report have been lukewarm. Attor-
ney Richard Feller believes that "the work of the Commission in no way
resolved the inherent philosophical differences between personal manag-
ers, talent agents, and artists on the subject of regulation. ' 79  The
Amendments, therefore, represent a state-of-the-art political compromise
(to the extent possible) among the interests of the various parties.
In Feller's article, "California's Revised Talent Agencies Act: Fine-
Tuning the Regulation of Employment Procurement in the Entertain-
ment Industry," he concludes that "the Act in California hopefully will
allow all of the parties in most circumstances to play a continued role in
the employment procurement process on a lawful basis."" ° Feller's hope
is exactly that-a hope. With the Commission's report and the revised
Talent Agencies Act, personal managers will still have a difficult time
doing their job of guiding artists' careers without breaking the law.
V. CONCLUSION
While the goal and the attempt of the California Entertainment
Commission was noble, the Commission fell far short of success in
resolving the controversies and conflicts prevalent in the field of artist
representation. California's Act is indeed the most highly developed in
the artist representation arena, but the state and its people in the en-
tertainment industry must not become complacent with an Act that still
breeds discontent.
The future is sure to bring new accounts of personal managers being
ordered to return their commissions to dissatisfied artists for breaking a
vague and incomprehensible law. The test of California and its entertain-
ment industry's flexibility and responsiveness is far from over. Only time
will tell how the Legislature, Labor Commissioner, artists, agents, man-
78. Id. at 34.
79. Feller, California's Revised Talent Agencies Act: Fine Tuning the Regulation of Em-
ployment Procurement in the Entertainment Industry, 5 ENT. SP. LAW. 3 (1986).
80. Id. at 28.
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agers and lawyers will respond to future occurrences in the continuing
game of artist representation in the entertainment industry.
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